

# Final Exam Study Guide

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## Market Equilibrium

### Demand and Supply


- **Demand function:** relates quantity demanded to price, e.g.

$$q_D = 12 - 2p$$

- **Inverse demand function:** relates price to quantity demanded, e.g.

$$p = 6 - 0.5q_D$$

- Describes the ordinary graph of the demand curve:




- *Choke price:* price where demand crosses the vertical axis ( $q_D = 0$ )
- Can always obtain inverse demand function by solving for  $p$  in the demand function
- **Supply function:** relates quantity supplied to price, e.g.

$$q_S = 0.5p - 0.5$$

- **Inverse supply function:** relates price to quantity supplied, e.g.


$$p = 1 + 2q_S$$

- Describes the ordinary graph of the supply curve:



- *Choke price*: price where demand crosses the vertical axis ( $q_D = 0$ )
- Can always obtain inverse demand function by solving for  $p$  in the demand function

## Equilibrium



- Equilibrium exists at a unique price  $p^*$  where  $q^* = q_D = q_S$
- $p^*$  can always be found by setting original Demand function and Supply function

$$\begin{aligned}
 q_D &= q_S \\
 12 - 2p &= 0.5p - 0.5 \\
 12 &= 2.5p - 0.5 \\
 12.5 &= 2.5p \\
 5 &= p^*
 \end{aligned}$$

- Knowing  $p^*$ , can plug into either Demand function or Supply function to find  $q^*$ :

$$q_D = 12 - 2p$$


$$q_D = 12 - 2(5)$$

$$q^* = 2$$

## Disequilibrium: Surplus and Shortage

- **Shortage** (excess demand), a price below  $p^*$ ,  $q_D > q_S$ 
  - buyers will bid price upwards
- **Surplus** (excess supply), a price above  $p^*$ ,  $p_D < q_S$ 
  - sellers will lower asking prices

## Consumer and Producer Surplus



- Consumer Surplus = Max WTP (Demand) -  $p^*$
- Producer Surplus =  $p^*$  - Min WTA (Supply)
- Area of Triangle =  $\frac{1}{2}bh$
- Elasticity (in equilibrium) affects surplus:
  - *More* elastic:
    - \* less benefit from this particular exchange (have other options, etc)
    - \* less distance between Max WTP or Min WTA (choke price) and market price
    - \* less surplus
  - *Less* elastic:
    - \* more benefit from this particular exchange (have few options, etc)
    - \* greater distance between Max WTP or Min WTA (choke price) and market price
    - \* more surplus

## Efficiency of Markets

- Entrepreneurship, arbitrage, markets as a process
- Role of prices in coordinating information and incentives


- **Allocative efficiency:** allocate resources to highest-valued uses
  - maximum consumer and producer surplus
- **Pareto efficiency:** no improvements exist that would make at least one person better off without making another person worse off
- Markets are efficient when they
  1. Are competitive
  2. Can reach equilibrium
  3. Have no externalities

## Monopoly

### Features

1. Firm's products may have few close substitutes
2. Barriers to entry, making entry costly
3. Firm is a "price-searcher": can set optimal price  $p^*$  in addition to quantity  $q^*$

### Marginal Revenue, Markup, and Price Elasticity



- Inverse demand:  $p = a - bQ \implies$  Marginal revenue:  $MR(q) = a - 2bq$

Price Elasticity	$MR(q)$	$R(q)$
$ \epsilon  > 1$ Elastic	+	Increasing
$ \epsilon  = 1$ Unit	0	Maximized
$ \epsilon  < 1$ Inelastic	-	Decreasing

- Size of markup depends on **price elasticity of demand**
  - $\downarrow$  price elasticity:  $\uparrow$  markup

- **Lerner Index** measures market power as % of firm's price that is markup above (marginal) cost


$$L = \frac{p - MC(q)}{p} = -\frac{1}{\epsilon}$$

- In perfect competition,  $L = 0$  (as  $p = MC$ )
- As  $L \rightarrow 1$ , more market power


## Profit-Maximization Problem Solution

1. Produce the optimal amount of output  $q^*$  where  $MR(q) = MC(q)$
2. Raise price to maximum consumers are WTP:  $p^* = Demand(q^*)$
3. Calculate profit with average cost:  $\pi = [p - AC(q)]q$
4. Shut down in the *short run* if  $p < AVC(q)$ 
  - Minimum of  $AVC$  curve where  $MC(q) = AVC(q)$
5. Exit in the *long run* if  $p < AC(q)$ 
  - Minimum of  $AC$  curve where  $MC(q) = AC(q)$

## Consequences of Market Power



- In a *competitive* market in long run equilibrium:
  - **Economic profit** is driven to \$0
  - **Allocatively efficient**:  $p = MC(q)$  (goods produced until  $MB = MC$ )
  - **Productively efficient**:  $p = AC(q)_{min}$ , otherwise firms would enter/exit
  - Consumer surplus and producer surplus is maximized




- If that same market were monopolized:
  - Monopolist sets  $MR(q) = MC(q)$ , raises price to Max WTP (Demand)

- Restricts output and raises price, compared to competitive market
- Earns monopoly profits ( $p > AC$ )
- Loss of consumer surplus
- **Deadweight loss** of surplus destroyed from lost gains from trade
- Rent-seeking
  - “prize” of monopoly is monopoly profits
  - firm(s) willing to invest resources to compete for the privilege to be a monopoly (e.g. lobbying for barriers to entry, preventing competition, etc)

## Sources of Market Power


1. Control over a key resource
2. Barriers to entry
  - ex: occupational licensing, intellectual property rights, anticompetitive regulation, etc.
3. Economies of scale/**natural monopoly**



- One firm with greater economies of scale can produce more at a lower cost than competition
  - Often regulated by government - force the monopolist to act closer to a competitive outcome ( $p = MC$ )

## Pricing Strategies

- Goal of price-discrimination is to charge different prices to different customers to convert consumer surplus into profit for firm
- To engage in price discrimination, two conditions:
  1. Firm must have market power
  2. Firm must be able to prevent arbitrage/resale
- 1<sup>st</sup>-degree price discrimination: firm charges each customer their max WTP
- 3<sup>rd</sup>-degree price discrimination: firm segments market into multiple groups based on demand/elasticity differences
  - charge higher price to less-elastic group
  - charge lower price to more-elastic group
  - must be able to separate customers into groups by identifiable characteristics before sale
- 2<sup>nd</sup>-degree price discrimination: firm can't identify customer type beforehand, offers different options




- tying: lower price on “base” good, raise price on refills
- bundling: combine multiple goods into a package and prevent sale of individual components of bundle

## Monopolistic Competition

### Features

- Firms have some market power
- 1. Firms selling imperfect substitutes
- 2. No Barriers to entry
- 3. Firm is a “price-searcher”
- In the short run, modeled like a monopoly



- In the long run, no barriers to entry  $\implies$  competitive entry pushes  $\pi$  to 0
  - demand for each firm’s product decreases & becomes more elastic until  $p = AC$  for each firm
- Compare to perfect competition (left)
  - Lower output and higher price, less consumer surplus, some deadweight loss
  - Worse than perfect competition, but better than monopoly

## Oligopoly

- Industry with few sellers

- Firms are strategic and interdependent
- Prisoner's Dilemma: game where each player faces an incentive not to cooperate, but all players are better off if they all cooperate

		<b>Player 2</b>	
		Cooperate	Defect
<b>Player 1</b>	Cooperate	10      0	10      25
	Defect	25      5	0      5

Figure 1: Prisoner's Dilemma example

- **Nash equilibrium:** outcome where each player has no incentive to switch strategies
  - In the example above, it is (Defect, Defect)
- **Cartel:** firms colluding to raise prices together and split monopoly profits
  - Not a Nash equilibrium! Each player has an incentive to break the agreement and Defect

## Comparing Industries

Industry	Firms	Entry	Price (LR Eq.)	Output	Profits (LR)	Cons. Surplus	DWL
Perfect competition	Very many	Free	Lowest ( $MC$ )	Highest	0	Highest	None
Monopolistic competition	Many	Free	Higher ( $p > MC$ )	Lower	0	Lower	Some
Oligopoly (non-cooperative)	Few	Barriers?	Higher	Lower	Some	Lower	Some
Monopoly1 (or cartel)	1	Barriers	Highest	Lowest	Highest	Lowest	Large

## Contestable Markets

- Markets are **contestable** if:
  1. There are no barriers to entry or exit
  2. Firms have similar technologies (i.e. similar cost structure)
  3. There are no sunk costs
- Threat of entry  $\implies$  Nash equilibrium is the competitive outcome,  $p = MC$  with just 1 firm!