class: title-slide # 4.2 — Consequences & Sources of Power ## ECON 306 • Microeconomic Analysis • Spring 2023 ### Ryan Safner<br> Associate Professor of Economics <br> <a href="mailto:safner@hood.edu"><i class="fa fa-paper-plane fa-fw"></i>safner@hood.edu</a> <br> <a href="https://github.com/ryansafner/microS23"><i class="fa fa-github fa-fw"></i>ryansafner/microS23</a><br> <a href="https://microS23.classes.ryansafner.com"> <i class="fa fa-globe fa-fw"></i>microS23.classes.ryansafner.com</a><br> --- class: inverse # Outline ### [The Social Harm of Market Power](#4) ### [What *Is* a Monopoly?](#) ### [The Dynamic Benefits of Markets (with Market Power)](#19) ### [What If You’re Just *Better*?](#34) ### [Barriers to Entry](#44) ### [The *Ugly* of Market Power: Rent-Seeking](#59) ### [Antitrust](#75) --- # Market Power: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly .pull-left[ .smaller[ - No market is perfectly competitive, but **that does not .ul[necessarily] imply market failure** - Static vs. dynamic benefits of markets - Market power is *interesting* - Most firms clearly have *some* market power - Market power `\(\neq\)` bad, necessarily! - Today, we’ll examine what I call .hi-purple[“the good, the bad, and the ugly” of market power] - (but not necessarily in that order) ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/monopolyman2.jpg) ] ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # The Social Harm of Market Power --- # Perfectly Competitive Market .pull-left[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-1-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-2-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .smallest[ - In a .hi[competitive market] in .hi[long run equilibrium]: - .hi-purple[Economic profit] is driven to $0; resources (factors of production) optimally allocated - .hi-purple[Allocatively efficient]: `\(\color{blue}{p}=\color{red}{MC(q)}\)`, maximized .blue[CS] `\(+\)` .red[PS] - .hi-purple[Productively efficient]: `\(\color{blue}{p}=\color{orange}{AC(q)_{min}}\)` (otherwise firms would enter/exit) ] --- # The Bad of Monopoly: DWL I .pull-left[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-3-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - Consider an industry with some simplified cost assumptions: `$$C(q)=cq$$` - No fixed cost; `\(\color{red}{MC(q)}=\color{orange}{AC(q)} = c\)`<sup>.magenta[†]</sup> - If this industry were **competitive**, firms would set `\(\color{blue}{p_c}=\color{red}{MC(q)}\)` and (collectively), industry would produce `\(q_c\)` - Max .blue[consumer surplus], `\(\color{green}{\pi=0}\)` .footnote[<sup>.magenta[†]</sup> Why? [See here](/resources/appendices/2.5-appendix/#common-cost-assumptions) for a reminder.] ] --- # The Bad of Monopoly: DWL II .pull-left[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-4-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - A **monopolist** would face *entire* industry demand and set `\((q_m,p_m)\)`: - Set .purple[`\\(MR(q)\\)`] `\(=\)` .red[`\\(MC(q)\\)`]: `\(q_m\)` - Raise `\(p\)` to .blue[max. WTP (Demand)]: `\(p_m\)` - .hi-purple[Restricts output and raises price], compared to competitive market - Earns .hi-green[monopoly profits (`\\(p>AC\\)`)] - Loss of .hi-blue[consumer surplus] ] --- # The Bad of Monopoly: DWL III .pull-left[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-5-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - **Deadweight loss** of surplus destroyed from lost gains from trade - Consumers willing to buy more than `\(q_m\)`, if the monopolist would lower prices! - Monopolist *would* benefit by accepting lower prices to sell more than `\(q_m\)`, but this would yield *less* than _maximum_ profits - main problem is that monopolist must lower price on all units sold ] --- # The Bad of Monopoly II .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/woodyharrelsoncrymoney.gif) ] ] .pull-right[ - **Deadweight loss** of surplus destroyed from lost gains from trade - Consumers willing to buy more than `\(q_m\)`, if the monopolist would lower prices! - Monopolist *would* benefit by accepting lower prices to sell more than `\(q_m\)`, **but this would yield _less_ than _maximum_ profits** - main problem is that monopolist must lower price on all units sold ] --- # In General .center[ ![:scale 45%](../images/spongebobmonopoly.jpg) ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # What Is a Monopoly? --- # What Is a Monopoly? .pull-left[ - Everyone (economists & the public alike) generally agree that monopoly is bad - .hi-turquoise[But what *is* a monopoly?] - A surprisingly difficult question to answer! ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/monopolyshrug.jpg) ] ] --- # In Ye Olde Days .left-column[ .center[ ![:scale 75%](../images/edwardcoke.jpg) Lord Edward Coke 1552—1634 Chief Justice (King's Bench) ] ] .right-column[ > “A monopoly is an institution or allowance by the king, by his grant, commission, or otherwise...to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade,” (181). .source[Coke, Edward, 1648, *Institutes of the laws of England*, Part 3] ] --- # In Ye Olde Days > "[A man lives] in a house built with monopoly bricks, with windows...of monopoly glass; heated by monopoly coal (in Ireland monopoly timber), burning in a grate made of monopoly iron...He washed himself in monopoly soap, his clothes in monopoly starch. He dressed in monopoly lace, monopoly linen, monopoly leather, monopoly gold thread...His clothes were dyed with monopoly dyes. He ate monopoly butter, monopoly currants, monopoly red herrings, monopoly salmon, and monopoly lobsters. His food was seasoned with monopoly salt, monopoly pepper, monopoly vinegar...He wrote with monopoly pens, on monopoly writing paper; read (through monopoly spectacles, by the light of monopoly candles) monopoly printed books," (quoted in Acemoglu and Robinson 2011, pp.187-188). .source[Hill, Christopher, (1961), *The Century of Revolution* Acemoglu, Daron and James A Robinson, 2013, *Why Nations Fail*] --- # Isn’t a Single Seller a Monopolist? .pull-left[ .smallest[ - Isn’t the only seller of something a monopolist? - A new inventor? - An artist? - LeBron James? - First-mover? - The only hardware store in town? - The only seafood restaurant? ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/pradanowhere.jpg) ] ] --- # Maybe...Depends on the Price Elasticity! .center[ .smallest[ .hi-purple[The more (less) price elastically a good, the less (more) market power]: `\(L=\frac{p-MC(q)}{p}=-\frac{1}{\epsilon}\)` ] ] .pull-left[ .center[ .smallest[ Demand *Less* Elastic at `\(p^*\)` ] ] <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-6-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ .center[ .smallest[ Demand *More* Elastic at `\(p^*\)` ] ] <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-7-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # And Recall What Determines Price Elasticity! .pull-left[ .smallest[ - A main determinant of price elasticity is the .hi-purple[availability of substitutes]! - More substitutes `\(\rightarrow\)` higher elasticity `\(\rightarrow\)` less market power - Universal substitute: not buying! - So again, it’s .blue[Consumer Demand] all the way down! - Aside: courts in .hi[antitrust] cases often also focus on the .hi-purple[cross-price elasticities] between goods! - helps determine substitutability of a good, where/whether customers will go in response to price hike ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/groceryaisle.jpg) ] ] --- # And Cross-Price Elasticity! .left-column[ .center[ ![](../images/court1.jpg) ] ] .right-column[ .quitesmall[ > “For every product substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite a range. The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in technical terms, products whose 'cross-elasticities of demand' are small,” *Times-Picayune Publishing v. United States*, 345 U.S. 594 at 621 n. 31 (1953) > “Every manufacturer is the sole producer of the particular commodity it makes but its control in the above sense of the relevant market depends on the availability of alternative commodities for buyers: i.e., whether there is a cross-elasticity of demand between cellophane and the other wrappings,” *U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &. Co.*, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) > “Cross-price elasticity is a more useful tool than own-price elasticity in defining a relevant antitrust market. Cross-price elasticity estimates tell one where the lost sales will go when the price is raised, while own-price elasticity estimates simply tell one that a price increase would cause a decline in volume,” *New York v. Kraft General Foods*, 926 F. Supp. 321 (1995) ] ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # The Dynamic Benefits of Markets (with Market Power) --- # Markets as an Evolutionary Process .left-column[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/schumpeter2.jpg) Joseph Schumpeter 1883-1950 ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > “Capitalism...is by nature a form of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary...The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an .hi[evolutionary process],” (pp.82). > “[I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is...that kind of competition...from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization....hi[competition] which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage .hi[which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives],” (p.132). ] .source[Schumpeter, Joseph A, (1947), *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*] ] --- # Creative Destruction .left-column[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/schumpeter2.jpg) Joseph Schumpeter 1883-1950 ] ] .right-column[ > “Industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that .hi[incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within], incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This .hi[process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism]. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in,” (p.83). ] .source[Schumpeter, Joseph A, (1947), *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*] --- # Creative Destruction: Examples .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/horsebuggy.png) ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/car.png) ] ] --- # Creative Destruction: Example II .center[ ![:scale 65%](../images/evolutionofdesk.gif) ] --- # Creative Destruction: Example III .center[ ![:scale 40%](../images/59yearsofprogress.jpg) 59 years of progress ] --- # No Corporate Monolith Lasts Forever (On Its Own) .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/monopolyoldexamples.jpg) ] --- # No Corporate Monolith Lasts Forever (On Its Own) .center[ ![:scale 75%](../images/deadfirms.png) ] --- # No Corporate Monolith Lasts Forever (On Its Own) .center[ ![](../images/pcsmonopoly.jpg) ] --- # No Corporate Monolith Lasts Forever (On Its Own) .center[ ![:scale 75%](../images/aol_monopoly.png) ] --- # No Corporate Monolith Lasts Forever (On Its Own) .center[ ![:scale 75%](../images/facebook_fall.png) ] --- # Monopoly *Persists* Because of Entry Barriers .pull-left[ - Monopoly exists, and persists, because of .hi[barriers to entry] - otherwise, profits would get competed away by new entrants - markets become competitive over time as entrepreneurs enter & produce substitutes - .hi-purple[How easy is it to enter and compete with existing firm?] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/entrybarriersmeme.jpg) ] ] --- # Monopoly *Persists* Because of Entry Barriers .pull-left[ .smallest[ - (Some) possible types of entry barriers: - **Control over key resource** - **Technological superiority**: Name/brand recognition, high fixed/sunk costs, economies of scale, network externalities - **Government regulation**: Intellectual property rights, occupational licensing, public franchises, burdensome compliance, rent-seeking - “Natural” vs. “artificial” barriers to entry - .hi-purple[“open”] vs. .hi-purple[“closed”] monopoly ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 90%](../images/donotenter.png) ] ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # What If You’re Just *Better*? --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly I .pull-left[ - Recall: .hi-purple[economies of scale]: as `\(\uparrow q\)`, `\(\downarrow AC(q)\)` - .hi-purple[Minimum Efficient Scale (MES)]: `\(q\)` with the lowest `\(AC(q)\)` ] .pull-right[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-8-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly I .pull-left[ - Recall: .hi-purple[economies of scale]: as `\(\uparrow q\)`, `\(\downarrow AC(q)\)` - .hi-purple[Minimum Efficient Scale (MES)]: `\(q\)` with the lowest `\(AC(q)\)` - If MES is small relative to market demand... - .orange[AC] hits .blue[Market demand] during **diseconomies of scale**... ] .pull-right[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-9-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly I .pull-left[ - Recall: .hi-purple[economies of scale]: as `\(\uparrow q\)`, `\(\downarrow AC(q)\)` - .hi-purple[Minimum Efficient Scale (MES)]: `\(q\)` with the lowest `\(AC(q)\)` - If MES is small relative to market demand... - .orange[AC] hits .blue[Market demand] during **diseconomies of scale**... - .hi-purple[...can fit more identical firms into the industry!] ] .pull-right[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-10-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly I .pull-left[ - If MES is *large* relative to market demand... - .red[AC] hits .blue[Market demand] during **_economies_ of scale**... - .hi-purple[likely to be a single firm in the industry!] ] .pull-right[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-11-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly I .pull-left[ - If MES is *large* relative to market demand... - .red[AC] hits .blue[Market demand] during **_economies_ of scale**... - .hi-purple[likely to be a single firm in the industry!] - A .hi[natural monopoly] that can produce higher `\(q^*\)` and lower `\(p^*\)` than a competitive industry! ] .pull-right[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-12-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly II .pull-left[ .bg-washed-green.b--dark-green.ba.bw2.br3.shadow-5.ph4.mt5[ .green[**Example**]: Imagine a single isolated condo complex with 1,000 units far from any other buildings or telco infrastructure - **Fixed costs**: laying fiber optics to the complex is $100,000 - **Marginal costs**: connecting each unit: $0 ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/beachcondo1.jpeg) ] ] --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly II .pull-left[ - Suppose .hi-purple[10 providers] split the complex, each laying down their own cables, and each serving 100 units: $$\mathbf{AC(100)}=\frac{\$100,000}{100}=\$1,000 \text{/subscriber}$$ ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/beachcondo1.jpeg) ] ] --- # Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly II .pull-left[ - Suppose .hi-purple[1 provider] serves the complex serving all 1,000 units: $$\mathbf{AC(1,000)}=\frac{\$100,000}{1000}=\$100 \text{/subscriber}$$ ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/beachcondo1.jpeg) ] ] --- # Regulating Natural Monopolies .pull-left[ .smallest[ - Governments avoid “wasteful duplication” of competition by granting .hi-purple[exclusive franchises]: a single monopolist allowed in geographic region - Provider made a .hi-purple[common carrier]: monopolist must provide universal service to all - .hi-purple[Rate of return regulation]: gov’t and monopolist agree on a price to guarantee a “modest return on capital” (i.e. some `\(\pi>0)\)` - Attempting to `\(\uparrow q\)` and `\(\downarrow p\)` - Prohibition on price discrimination, enforced subsidies ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/publicutilities.png) ![:scale 100%](../images/commoncarrier.jpg) ] ] --- # Regulating Natural Monopoly .left-column[ .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/io_hex.png) ] ] .right-column[ - Are big tech firms monopolies? Should they be broken up? How should they be regulated? - We tackle some of these questions more in my Industrial Organization course: - [Lecture 4.4: Antitrust III: Big Tech & Hipster Antitrust](https://ios20.classes.ryansafner.com/class/4.4-class/) - [Lecture 4.5: Natural Monopoly Regulation](https://ios20.classes.ryansafner.com/class/4.5-class/) ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # Barriers to Entry --- # Intellectual Property I .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/pharmaceutical.png) ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/genericpill.jpg) ] ] --- # Intellectual Property II .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/got1.png) ] ] -- .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 75%](../images/gotpirated.png) Source: [Washington Post (Sept 8, 2017)](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/08/game-of-thrones-was-pirated-more-than-a-billion-times-far-more-than-it-was-watched-legally/) ] ] --- # Intellectual Property III .pull-left[ .quitesmall[ - For these economic reasons, .hi[patent] (for ideas and inventions) and .hi[copyright] (for expressions) laws exist - Grant *temporary* monopoly to recover fixed costs & provide incentive to undertake (risky and expensive) research/creativity - A *tradeoff* between incentives & access - See my intellectual property [lecture](https://laws21.classes.ryansafner.com/content/2.6-content/) from Economics of the Law for more ] .center[ ![:scale 30%](../images/law_hex.png) ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 40%](../images/US_Patent_cover.jpg) ![:scale 40%](../images/copyright.png) ] ] --- # Intellectual Property IV .pull-left[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/pbjpatent.png) ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 60%](../images/catpatent.png) ![:scale 60%](../images/catpatent2.png) ] ] --- # Intellectual Property V .pull-left[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/patentthicket.png) ] ] .pull-right[ - [Apple, Inc. vs. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.](https://www.theverge.com/apple/2011/11/2/2533472/apple-vs-samsung) - [Freakonomics: Apple vs. Samsung: Who Owns the Rectangle?](http://freakonomics.com/2012/08/03/apple-vs-samsung-who-owns-the-rectangle/) ] --- # Legal Prohibitions .pull-left[ .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/usps.png) ] ] .pull-right[ - The United States Postal Service is the only provider of first class mail allowed by order of the government - Starting another business that delivers mail is **illegal** .quitesmall[ > “Whoever establishes any private express for the conveyance of letters or packets, or in any manner causes or provides for the conveyance of the same by regular trips or at stated periods over any post route which is or may be established by law...shall be fined...or imprisoned...or both.” ([18 U.S.C. `\(\S\)` 1696](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1696)) ] ] --- # Taxis I .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/taxi.png) ] ] .pull-right[ ![](../images/taximedallion2.jpg) ] --- # Taxis II .center[ ![:scale 40%](../images/uberlyfttaxis.png) ] --- # Taxis III .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/uberprotest1.jpg) ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/uberprotest2.jpg) ] ] --- # Occupational Licensing I .center[ ![:scale 60%](../images/licensing.png) .tiny[ In 1950, 1 in 20 jobs required a license. Today it's 1 in 4. Source: [Obama White House (2015): Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Policymakers](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf) ] ] --- # Occupational Licensing II .center[ ![:scale 65%](../images/occupationallicensing2.png) .tiny[Source: [Mercatus Research (March 25, 2014): Occupational Licensing: Bad for Competition, Bad for Low-Income Workers](https://www.mercatus.org/publication/occupational-licensing-bad-competition-bad-low-income-workers) ]] --- # Occupational Licensing III .center[ ![:scale 75%](../images/migrationandlicensing.png) ] --- # Occupational Licensing IV .pull-left[ .center[ ![:scale 90%](../images/hairbraidingnpr.png) ] ] .pull-right[ .small[ > “‘It is illegal in the state of Utah to do any form of extensions without a valid cosmetology license,’ the e-mail read. ‘Please delete your ad, or you will be reported.’ > To get a license, Jestina would have to spend more than a year in cosmetology school. Tuition would cost $16,000 dollars or more.” Source: [NPR Planet Money](https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/06/22/155596305/episode-381-why-its-illegal-to-braid-hair-without-a-license) ] ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # The *Ugly* of Market Power: Rent-Seeking --- # The *Ugly* of Market Power: Rent-Seeking I .pull-left[ <img src="4.2-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-13-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - The .hi-green[monopoly profits] earned with market power are an .hi[economic rent] - A windfall return above opportunity cost .red[(MC)] - Creates an artificial scarcity from restricting entry & competition - This is the .hi-purple[“prize”] of market power ] --- # The *Ugly* of Market Power: Rent-Seeking II .pull-left[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/prize.jpg) ] ] .pull-right[ - Think of an .hi[economic rent] as a “prize,” the payment a person receives for a good above its opportunity cost - Creating rents creates competition for the rents, causing people to invest resources in .hi[rent-seeking] - The social cost of the rent is all of the resources invested in rent-seeking! ] --- # Government Intervention Creates Rents I .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/rents.jpg) ] ] .pull-right[ .smaller[ - Political authorities intervene in markets in various ways that benefit some groups at the expense of everyone else - subsidies to groups (often producers) - regulation of industries - tariffs, quotas, and special exemptions from these - tax breaks and loopholes - conferring monopoly and other privileges - See Mitchell (2013) in [today’s readings](/content/4.2-content) for examples ] ] --- # Government Intervention Creates Rents I .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/rents.jpg) ] ] .pull-right[ .smallest[ - These interventions create .hi[economic rents] for their beneficiaries by restricting competition - This is a transfer of wealth from consumers/taxpayers to politically-favored groups - The problem in politics .hi-purple[is you cannot give away money for free even if you tried!] - The promise of earning a rent breeds **competition over the rents** (.hi[rent-seeking]) - investments of resources to lobby political officials ] ] --- # Rent-Seeking .left-column[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/tullock2.jpg) Gordon Tullock 1922-2014 ] ] .right-column[ > “The rectangle to the left of the [Deadweight loss] triangle is the income transfer that a successful monopolist can extort from the customers. .hi[Surely we should expect that with a prize of this size dangling before our eyes, potential monopolists would be willing to invest large resources in the activity of monopolizing.] ... .hi[Entrepreneurs should be willing to invest resources in attempts to form a monopoly] until the marginal cost equals the properly discounted return,” (p.231). ] .source[Tullock, Gordon, (1967), "The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft," *Western Economic Journal* 5(3): 224-232.] --- # Tax Preparation? .center[ ![:scale 65%](../images/rentseekingtaxeswide.png) Source: [*ProPublica* (Mar 20, 2017)](https://www.propublica.org/article/filing-taxes-could-be-free-simple-hr-block-intuit-lobbying-against-it) ] --- # Milk? .center[ ![:scale 70%](../images/milkrentseeking.png) Source: [*New York Times* (Feb 13, 2017)](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/well/eat/got-almond-milk-dairy-farms-protest-milk-label-on-nondairy-drinks.html) ] --- # If You Look at the World Long Enough... .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/meme_lobby_protectionism.jpeg) ] ] -- .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/rentseekingeverywhere.jpg) ] ] --- # Regulation has a Dark Side .left-column[ .center[ ![:scale 80%](../images/stigler.png) George Stigler 1911-1991 Economics Nobel 1982 ] ] .right-column[ > “[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits,” (p.3). > “[E]very industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry. In addition, the regulatory policy will often be so fashioned as to retard the rate of growth of new firms,” (p.5). ] .source[Stigler, George J, (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 3:3-21] --- # Regulation has a Dark Side .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/governmentsachs.jpeg) ] ] .pull-right[ - .hi[Regulatory capture]: a regulatory body is **“captured”** by the very industry it is tasked with regulating - Industry members use agency to further their own interests - Incentives for firms to design regulations to harm competitors - Legislation & regulations written by lobbyists & industry-insiders ] --- # Regulation has a Dark Side .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/revolvingdoor.jpg) ] ] .pull-right[ - One major source of capture is the .hi-purple[“revolving door”] between the public and private sector - Legislators & regulators retire from politics to become highly paid consultants and lobbyists for the industry they had previously “regulated” ] --- # *Why* Do Firms Rent-Seek? .pull-left[ - Markets serve **consumers** (“consumer sovereignty”), *not* producers (or workers, etc)! - Successful market economies .hi-purple[produce wealth] and .hi-purple[destroy jobs] (and sometimes, industries) - Economic growth `\(\equiv\)` more output with fewer inputs - A .hi-purple[political problem]: why would producers permit the **destructive** side of creative destruction? ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 75%](../images/horsebuggy.png) ![:scale 50%](../images/typewriter.jpg) ] ] --- # No Easy Solutions, Only Trade Offs! .left-column[ .center[ ![](../images/thomassowell.jpg) .smallest[ Thomas Sowell 1930— ] ] ] .right-column[ > “[In economics] there are no solutions, there are only tradeoffs.” ] --- # No Easy Solutions, Only Trade Offs! .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/science_vs_easy_answers.jpg) ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # Antitrust --- # Antitrust and Competition Law I .pull-left[ - Aren't monopolies illegal in the U.S.? - **Yes**: engaging in anticompetitive practices in the U.S. is illegal under .hi[antitrust laws] - Laws intended to promote economic competition and reduce excessive market power - enforced by DOJ (criminal) and FTC (civil) ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 45%](../images/doj.png) ![:scale 45%](../images/ftc.png?) ] ] --- # Antitrust and Competition Law II .pull-left[ - Aren't monopolies illegal in the U.S.? - **No**: most monopolies exist *because* of explicit or implicit government-backing - Some markets actually work *better* as a monopoly (**“the good”**, .hi-purple[natural monopoly], patents, etc.) - Some markets and regulators are .hi-purple[captured] via **rent-seeking** firms to block competition (**“the ugly”**) ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/polcorrupt.jpg) ] ] --- # Antitrust and Competition Law III .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/ftcstatue.jpg) ] ] .pull-right[ **Sherman Antitrust Act (1890)** .smallest[ > `\(\S\)` 1: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." > `\(\S\)` 2: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony [...]" ] ] .source[26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. `\(\S\)` 1–7]